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The Dutch labour market is characterized by low job mobility and high average duration of 
unemployment for older jobseekers. This study investigates the role of wage-tenure profiles 
in explaining patterns of job mobility. Based on a large administrative database, the estimates 
show  that  wage-tenure  profiles  in  the  Netherlands  are  relatively  steep.  Furthermore, 
industries with high returns to tenure appear to have a high share of older workers, as well as 
high average job tenure. This implies that steep wage-tenure profiles are related to low levels 
of mobility. 
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The ageing of the workforce demands a sound understanding of the relationship between 
wage-tenure  profiles  and  the  labour-market  position  of  older  workers.  This  particularly 
applies to countries with rigid labour markets, such as the Netherlands. Compared to other 
countries Dutch job mobility is low, while the average duration of unemployment for older 
jobseekers and employment protection are high. Furthermore, international data suggest that 
wages in the Netherlands increase steeper with age than they do in many other countries (e.g., 
OECD, 2006). These characteristics are likely to be interrelated: The wages of older workers 
are high due to tenure- and age-related labour-market institutions that protect workers with 
long tenures, while low job mobility among older workers is caused by the steep wage-tenure 
profiles.  
  The aim of this research is to provide a set of estimates on wage-tenure profiles in the 
Netherlands. These estimates reveal whether or not wage-tenure profiles in the Netherlands 
are steep and whether or not such profiles are related to labour-market institutions and low 
mobility. The paper focuses on the impact of tenure (the duration of a match between a 
worker and a firm) on wages, as opposed to the impact of overall experience in the labour 
market. Returns to tenure are estimated using several models that address the problem of 
endogeneity of tenure in the wage equation (e.g., Altonji and Shakotko, 1987 and Topel, 
1991). Returns to tenure are generally interpreted as the firm-related component of wages, 
which may act as an impediment to mobility. The returns may reflect the return on firm-
specific  human  capital  (Becker,  1962)  or  deferred  compensation  schemes,  with  senior 
employees receiving wages in excess of marginal productivity (Lazear, 1981). If the worker 
moves to another firm, he will no longer receive this wage component. Next, the effect of 
workers’ seniority positions on wages is analysed. The underlying idea is that workers with 
the longest tenures may have a good bargaining position, possibly because they are protected 
by  labour-market  institutions  (e.g.,  Buhai  et  al.,  2008).  Finally,  the  research  investigates 
whether or not there is a correlation between high returns to tenure and the low job mobility 
of older workers across different sectors (e.g., Zwick, 2008). 
  Three main results are obtained. First, Dutch wage-tenure profiles are steep compared 
to those of other countries. The estimates suggest that wage growth is partly related to firm-
specific elements, which are lost in the case of job mobility. Second, the estimates suggest 




tenure, real wages are 3-4 percent higher when comparing the recently hired worker with the 
most senior worker. This estimate does not explain the steep wage-tenure profile because the 
effect is modest in an international comparison. Third, a correlation between high returns to 
tenure and low mobility is found: the higher the returns to tenure in a sector, the higher the 
share of older workers, and the average age and the average tenure of the sector’s workforce.  
  From a policy perspective, it is important to note that steep wage-tenure profiles and 
low job mobility do not necessarily pose a problem for the Dutch labour market. Firms may 
adopt  increasing  wage  profiles  for  several  reasons.  For  example,  wage  profiles  do  not 
necessarily push the wages of older workers above their marginal productivity when the costs 
and benefits of firm-specific investments are shared between employer and employee. Firms 
could even have an incentive to lower the mobility of workers to lengthen the period of the 
returns to the training investments or to lower transaction costs associated with hiring. Firms 
could use wage-tenure profiles to promote worker effort. If this is what is going on, returns to 
tenure and low job mobility could be optimal from a social point of view. With the ageing of 
the workforce, the mechanisms favouring steep wage-tenure profiles could however be under 
pressure. The reason is that the period of employment lengthens, increasing the risk that the 
knowledge  of  older  workers  becomes  obsolete  (e.g.,  De  Grip  and  Van  Loo,  2002).  In 
addition,  a  rigid  labour  market  harms  labour  market efficiency  by  preventing  an  optimal 
allocation of workers to jobs. Low mobility reduces the flexibility of the economy in case of 
a technological shock or when the economic environment becomes more challenging (e g., 
Ter Weel et al., 2010).  
  The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the theoretical background and 
the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the data. Section 4 presents the basic estimates and 
compares  them  to  estimates  for  other  countries  from  previous  studies.  Sections  5  and  6 
discuss the estimates showing the importance of seniority and differences across firms in 
explaining tenure profiles in the Netherlands. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Background and strategy 
The  measurement  and  interpretation  of  wage-tenure  profiles  is not  without  debate  in  the 
economic literature. There are several ways to estimate the returns to tenure. The seminal 
approaches by Altonji and Shakotko (1987), Abraham and Farber (1987) and Topel (1991) 




explanatory variable of wages, since unobserved individual and match-specific characteristics 
determine both the wage level as well as tenure. In other words, highly productive individuals 
tend to experience fewer quits and layoffs and high-quality matches tend to survive longer. 
Nevertheless,  the  first  analyses  in  this  paper  use  these  approaches  to  present  a  sound 
international comparison. 
  Topel (1991) finds substantial returns to tenure for the United States. He applies a 
two-stage first-differences procedure, in which the second step is a wage regression at job 
entry to identify the effect of experience on wages. A problem with this model is that workers 
who start a new job are a mixture of workers who are improving on their previous wage, 
workers who have been fired, and workers who have been displaced because of firm closure, 
all of whom find the current offer more attractive relative to unemployment. The impact of 
experience  on  wages  is  upward  biased  in  case  most  new  jobs  are  due  to  voluntary  job 
mobility. This biases the estimated effect of tenure downward. The true bias is unknown 
because  the  fraction  of  voluntary  and involuntary  mobility is unknown. Furthermore, the 
method does not fully take individual heterogeneity into account and this biases the estimated 
effect of tenure upward (e.g., Altonji and Williams, 2005 for a discussion). In the first step, a 
wage equation expressed in first differences is estimated on a sample of workers who work 
for the same firm since at least a year:  
 
∆  ￿￿￿    ∆  ￿￿￿ ￿   ∆  ￿￿￿
￿ ￿   …  ∆ ￿￿￿ ￿   ∆ ￿￿￿
￿ ￿    ..    ∆ ￿￿￿  (1) 
 
where  ∆  ￿￿￿  denotes  the  first  difference  in  the  real  hourly  wage  of  individual  i  in  job  j 
between time t and t-1,  ￿￿￿ is potential labour-market experience,  ￿￿￿ is job tenure in the 
current  job  and   ￿￿￿  is  the  error  term  with  the  usual  assumptions.  Estimating  in  first 
differences assures that fixed job and individual effects are controlled for. A drawback is that 
the linear effects of tenure and experience cannot be distinguished because both rise by one 
year (∆    ∆    1 . Therefore, a second step is needed to disentangle the linear effects of 
tenure and experience. In the second step, workers who started a new job are used to estimate 
the impact of experience on wages.
1 
 
1 First, simulated wages at the start of the job (calculated using results from the first-difference equation) are 
estimated using simulated experience at the start of the job as an explanatory variable. Second, the wage change 




  Next to the Topel-approach, this research estimates models suggested by Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987). The endogeneity problem is addressed by 
using  instrumental  variables  (IV)  for  tenure  and  experience.  The  degree  to  which  an 
individual’s actual tenure deviates from his average tenure over the observed job spell is used 
as an instrument
2 for that tenure, and likewise for experience: 
 
  ￿￿￿       ￿￿￿ ￿      ￿￿￿
￿
 ￿   …     ￿￿￿ ￿      ￿￿￿
￿
 ￿    ..     ￿￿￿    (2) 
with 
   ￿￿￿    ￿￿￿      ￿￿￿   and      ￿￿￿    ￿￿￿      ￿￿￿ . 
 
   ￿￿￿ is defined as the deviation of  ￿￿￿ from the mean over job spell    ￿￿￿, and similarly for 
   ￿￿￿.  
 
Two models are distinguished: a model for which only tenure is instrumented, and a model 
for which both tenure and experience are instrumented. As the method does not deal with 
unobserved match-specific characteristics the resulting estimates provide underestimates of 
the true effect of tenure on wages (e.g., Altonji and Williams, 2005 for a discussion). 
  Two recent studies address the problem of unobserved match-specific characteristics 
and  show  its  relevance.  Dustmann  and  Meghir  (2005)  exploit  information  on  displaced 
workers to identify the effect of experience and tenure on wages. The idea is that displaced 
workers due to firm closure are a random sample, because they switched jobs neither by their 
own choice nor by being selected for dismissal by the firm. The estimates point at positive 
returns to job tenure in Germany, especially for unskilled workers. Buchinsky et al. (2010) 
exploit a structural dynamic model with endogenous mobility. They confront the model with 
the  data  by  estimating  a  wage  equation  along  with  separate  equations  for  mobility  and 
participation. The estimates suggest low returns to tenure in France and high returns in the 
United  States.  The  latter  are  even  higher  than  the  estimates  of  Topel  (1991).  The 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
experience. The average return to experience from these two approaches is subtracted from the joint effect of 
tenure and experience to determine returns to tenure. 
2 The variables ￿ ￿￿￿￿ and  ￿ ￿￿￿￿ serve as instruments in the technical sense that they correlate with tenure and 




interpretation of these estimates is that returns to tenure in the United States are likely to 
serve as a device to counter excess job mobility.  
  A variety of theoretical models explains the rise of wages with job tenure, including 
theories  on  human  capital  and  incentives.  First,  human  capital  accumulation  due  to 
investments in specific human capital provide an explanation for why wages rise with tenure 
(e.g., Becker, 1962 and Ben-Porath, 1967).
3 Second, incentive theories emphasise that, since 
effort  is  often  difficult  to  observe,  deferred  compensation  may  be  optimal  (e.g.,  Lazear, 
1981). Firms and workers enter into an implicit contract that serves as an incentive device 
which solves the agency problem of the firm. Workers receive a wage below their marginal 
productivity when tenure is still low and a wage above their marginal productivity when 
tenure rises. Third, search and matching models explain returns to tenure by focussing on the 
costs of hiring and firing (e.g., Burdett, 1978; Jovanovic, 1979). Fourth, bargaining theories 
are congruous with wages rising with tenure.  In the current study an attempt is made to 
quantify the wage effect of bargaining power, possibly derived from the LIFO layoff rule. 
Since firm-specific capital represents a value to the firm, under certain assumptions it is in the 
firm’s interest to avoid workers quitting. One such strategy may be to let wages increase 
gradually with tenure (Burdett and Coles, 2003). Other theories say that firms need senior 
workers to instruct and cooperate with new workers (Lindbeck and Snower, 1990) and that 
incumbent workers receive a seniority profile in wages  as well as  a  LIFO layoff  rule in 
exchange (Kuhn and Robert, 1989). 
  Not many empirical studies exist on the relation between wages and productivity, 
because labour productivity is often unobserved. Borghans et al. (2007) give an overview of 
studies on productivity–wage gaps regarding the United States and Canada. These studies 
(Medoff and Abraham, 1981; Kotlikoff et al., 1993; Dostie, 2006) generally provide evidence 
that older workers are paid wages exceeding their marginal productivity. For the Netherlands, 
Van Ours et al. (2011) found that many specifications estimated in their study indicate that 
older workers are relatively overpaid. The final specification, however, accounting for the 
potential endogeneity of the change in age composition, shows that productivity and wage 
 
3 However, investment in specific human capital does not necessarily imply that wages depend on job tenure. In 
an ideal world, the firm, instead of the risk-averse worker, should bear the entire risk of the investment and 
receive all quasi-rents, since firms can diversify risks on the capital market. In practice labour contracts are 





both increase with age. Their study concludes that the productivity–wage gap at high ages is 
bound to be small in the Netherlands. 
  Some  recent  studies  address  the  relation  between  the  wage-tenure  profile  and 
mobility. For the Netherlands, Borghans et al. (2007) finds a high wage growth for older 
workers to be related to a low outflow of older workers. For Germany, Zwick (2008) finds 
that establishments with high returns to tenure are characterized by high average tenures of 
workers and less inflow of older employees. 
3. Data 
The main dataset applied in this research is the Dutch Social Statistical Database (SSB-jobs). 
It contains information for the years 1999-2005. It is a linked employer-employee dataset and 
based on administrative data. It includes information about all jobs, with information on gross 
wages and hours worked available for about one-third of the observations. Since the sample 
of  observations  that  includes  wages  and  hours  worked  remains  the  same  over  time,  the 
dataset has the characteristics of a panel. The level of educational attainment is included by 
merging SSB-jobs to the Dutch Labour Force Survey (DLFS). The DLFS is a repeated cross-
section  covering  about  10  percent  of  the  labour  force.  Education  is  assumed  to  be  time 
invariant. We further restrict our analysis to male workers, working full-time (35 hours or 
more), employed in the private sector, aged 18-64, and working in firms with at least 10 
employees.  Standby  employees  and  employees  working  for  temporary  work  agencies  are 
excluded from the sample. Depending on the specification of the empirical model 300-400 
thousand observations are obtained. 
  Since the exact starting date of jobs is known, tenure can be  computed. A job is 
defined as a contractual relationship between an employee and an employer. Internal mobility 
within a firm is not observed. Potential experience is defined as age minus years of education. 
  Figure 1a and 1b show the average real hourly wages by experience and tenure in the 
Netherlands. The horizontal axis measures years of labour-market experience (Panel a) and 
tenure with the firm (Panel b). The average real hourly wages for males shows a concave 
relationship in experience. This is true for each level of education but seems to be more 
pronounced for workers with higher levels of education. The same is true for the patterns of 










Figure 1. Average real wages of men by experience (a) and tenure (b) 
  
 
4. The wage-tenure profiles 
 
Table 1 presents the cumulative effects of tenure on the real wages of male workers in the 
private sector. The top row in the top panel shows estimates of equation (1) and the top rows 
in the middle and bottom panels display the estimates from estimating equation (2). The 
cumulative effect of tenure can be interpreted as an estimate of what a typical worker would 
lose if his job were to end exogenously. As discussed above in Section 2, the first-differences 
approach (shown in the top panel of Table 1) generates a higher return to tenure. The results 
from  the  IV-models  (middle  and  bottom  panels  of  Table  1)  indicate  that  the  return  of 
remaining in a job for 10 years, compared to leaving earlier, is 6-7 percent in terms of real 
wages. After 20 years of tenure, the cumulative return is between 11-12 percent. 
















Table 1: Returns to tenure (in percentages) 
  5 years  10 years  15 years  20 years 
         
First differences         
Netherlands 2000-2005 
(a)  21  42  62  81 
Topel (1991) USA 1968-1983  18  25  28  34 
Lefranc (2003) USA 1981-1992  6  11  15  19 
Lefranc (2003) France 1990-1997  8  15  20  25 
Williams (2009) UK 1991-2001  8  11  N.A.  9 
Zwick (2008) West Germany 1998-2003  23  40  56  73 
         
Instrumental variables for tenure 
(b)         
Netherlands 1999-2005 
(a)  3  7  9  12 
Altonji et al. (1987), USA 1968-1983  3  3  3  4 
Dustmann et al. (2005), West Germany 1991-1997  1  2  4  6 
Williams (2009), UK 1991-2001  5  6  NA  8 
Zwick (2008), West Germany 1998-2003  6  8  9  10 
         
Instrumental variables for tenure and experience         
Netherlands 1999-2005 
(a)  4  7  10  11 
Altonji et al. (1987) , USA 1968-1983  4  3  4  5 
Dustmann et al. (2005), W-Germany 1991-1997  -1  -2  -3  -3 
Zwick (2008), West Germany 1998-2003  5  5  5  5 
a) The figures refer to the cumulative returns to tenure (in %) according to the different estimation techniques 
with additional correction for experience, demographics and educational attainment. For all regressions the 
impact of tenure is highly significant. The cumulative returns are based on point estimates; estimated 
coefficients and standard errors are presented in the Appendix, table A.1-A.2. The results on the method of first 
differences are based on Topel (1991), while the results for the instrumental variables are based on Altonji and 
Shakotko (1987) and Abraham and Farber (1987). 
b) For comparison, returns to experience after 10 (20) years according to the IV model with tenure being 
instrumented amount to 62% (80%) for the Netherlands, 47% (91%) for the US (Altonji et al., 1987), and 68% 
(132%) for West Germany (Zwick, 2008). 
 
To assess whether or not wage-tenure profiles in the Netherlands are steep, the estimation 
results  are  compared  with  other  countries’  outcomes  obtained  by  the  same  regression 
techniques.  Compared  to  other  studies,  the  first-differences  model  appears  to  generate 
relatively high returns to tenure in the Netherlands, much higher than those found for the 
United  States.  In  addition,  compared  to  several  European  countries,  the  returns  in  the 
Netherlands are high. Only the returns to tenure in West Germany are of the same order of 




returns in the Netherlands are comparable to those in West Germany.  The returns in the 
United States are lower. For the IV models with tenure and experience, the returns to tenure 
are relatively high in the Netherlands compared to both the United States and West Germany.
  Relative  to  the  returns  to  tenure,  the  returns  to  experience  are  high  (see  Table  1, 
footnote b)). This is not only the case for the Netherlands; it is a common finding across 
countries. Since experience is not necessarily firm-related, returns to experience are not an 
impediment to labour mobility. 
 
5. Seniority 
One source of high returns to tenure is the increase in bargaining power of more senior 
workers. This power may increase with seniority due to for example LIFO layoff rules in the 
Netherlands.
4 We assess the impact of seniority on hourly wages, apart from the effect of 
tenure, by estimating the effect on wages of a worker’s relative seniority position in the firm. 
  The seniority index, which describes the seniority of an individual relative to that of 
his colleagues in the same firm, is determined using information about all workers in all firms 
in all years. The seniority index is defined, consistent with Buhai et al. (2008), in such a way 
that it is zero for the most recent hire and rising in the time workers are employed with the 
firm.
5 The seniority index is useful but not a perfect approximation of the potential increase 
in  bargaining  power  of  senior  workers.  Labour-market  institutions  play  a  role  and  job 
heterogeneity within firms can restrict the representativeness of the index because employers 
may want to reduce employment in some age groups more than in others. 
  The empirical analysis of the impact of seniority on real wages is implemented by 
extending  the  real  wage  equation  with  the  seniority  index.  This  has  been  done  for  the 
standard specifications of the various models discussed earlier in this section. The effect of 
seniority is measured in addition to that of tenure, so that it can be seen as the impact of 
higher seniority if all other characteristics, including tenure, are equal.  
  Table  2  presents  the  estimates.  All  specifications  suggest  that  seniority  has  a 
significant positive effect on real wages. An effect of 0.004 implies that, if a worker develops 
from being the most newly hired worker to the most senior worker in a firm, his real wage 
 
4 In case of collective dismissal or dismissal for economic reasons, the LIFO principle is applied per job group. 
The Dutch government implemented a reform in 2006, which is however outside our period of observation.  
5 The seniority index of worker i in firm j at period t is defined as -log(number of workers in firm j at period t 
employed at least as long as worker i)/(total number of workers in firm j at time t). See Buhai et al. (2008) for 




increases by about 3 percent due to seniority.
6 The magnitude of the Dutch seniority effect is 
low in comparison to the effects for Portugal and Denmark, as found by Buhai et al. (2008). 
This is remarkable because employment-protection legislation for regular contracts in the 
Netherlands is stricter than in Denmark. Although there is some positive effect of seniority on 
wages, Dutch workers apparently exploit their individual bargaining power derived from their 
seniority position only to a limited extent. A possible interpretation of the modest effect is 
that the pivotal role of unions in the Netherlands reflects a high social value attached to wage 
equality and low importance of wage renegotiations at the individual level. A second possible 
interpretation is that the need to exploit individual bargaining power is low because returns to 
tenure are high for other reasons. 
 
Table 2: Effect of the seniority index on real wages 
(a) 
 
Netherlands (b)  Denmark (c)  Portugal (c) 
   Coef.     Std. Err.     Coef.     Std. Err.     Coef.     Std. Err. 
First difference  0.002  **  (0.0008)  0.005  ***  (0.0004)  0.014  ***  (0.0007) 
IV (tenure and 
experience)  0.004  *  (0.0024)                         
a) The seniority index measures the seniority position of a worker relative to his colleagues in the same firm. 
***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% respectively 10% level. Standard 
errors in parentheses. b) Own estimation results. c) Buhai et al.(2008). This study also reports results for Fixed 
Effect, and also for this method the impact for the Netherlands is clearly smaller than for Denmark and Portugal. 
 
6. Composition of the workforce 
The composition of the workforce, and in particular the share of older workers in an industry, 
may be related to the returns to tenure in that industry. This will not explain high returns to 
tenure in the Netherlands relative to other countries, but it sheds light on patterns of returns 
within the Netherlands. These patterns may be related to the share of older workers, average 
age and to average job duration. In particular the latter variable is related to job mobility as a 
high average duration would indicate low mobility. 
  The relationship between the composition of the workforce and returns to tenure is 
analysed by regressing an outcome variable, for example the share of older workers in firm, 
 
6 For example, for a firm with 1,000 workers, when a worker moves from being the newest hire to the most 
senior worker, the effect on wages is the estimated coefficient times the change in seniority index, that is, 0.006 




on an industry-specific tenure effect (conditional on several control variables).
7 Alternative 
variables, like average age, average tenure, share of young workers and share of flexible 
workers, are analysed as well.
8 The measure for the industry-specific tenure effect is derived 
from the wage-tenure analysis described earlier, where now the specification of the IV model 
with tenure and experience is extended by introducing one extra variable that measures tenure 
in a specific industry.
9  In total, 33 industries in the private sector  are  distinguished. The 
regression  produces  33  estimated  industry-specific  tenure  coefficients,  which  serve  as  a 
measure of the effect of tenure on wages in these particular industries. 
  Table 3 presents the coefficient of the measure for the industry-specific tenure effect; 
coefficients for other control variables are not presented. Each row relates to a regression 
with  the  same  right-hand  side  variables,  but  with  a  different  left-hand  side  variable.  All 
effects are significant at the one percent level. The results suggest that the higher the returns 
to tenure, the higher the share of older workers (aged 55–64) in the firm and the lower the 
share of younger workers (aged 15–24) and workers with flexible contracts. Furthermore: the 
higher the returns to tenure, the higher the average age and tenure of workers in the firm. In 
particular the correlation with the average tenure suggests there is also a positive correlation 
between the wage-tenure profiles and the composition of the workforce.  
  Economic  theory  offers  several  possible  explanations  for  a  positive  correlation 
between  wage-tenure profiles and mobility. First, such a correlation may be obtained when 
firms apply deferred compensation schemes as a tool to purposefully reduce the mobility of 
their  workforce.  High  transaction  costs  when  hiring  workers  may,  for  example,  be  an 
argument for firms to apply deferred compensation. It lengthens the period of return of their 
investments.  Second,  the  correlation  may  indicate  that  firm-specific  human  capital 
investments  are  important.  The  returns  to  firm-specific  investments  will  take  place  for 
employer-employee matches with a long expected duration. The causality may however also 
run the other way around: a high share of older workers in a firm may generate steep wage 
profiles as well-protected older workers may use their wage bargaining position. Another 
 
7  The  variables  regarding  the  composition  of  the  workforce  are  calculated  using  an  integral  dataset  of  all 
workers in all Dutch firms. 
8 Zwick (2008) performs a similar analysis for Germany and finds that ‘German establishments paying stronger 
seniority wages than the average establishment in their sector have a higher tenure of their employees’. 




explanation  may  be  that  older  workers  are  overrepresented  in  sectors  of  industry  where 
investments in firm-specific human capital are important. 
Table 3. Estimation results regarding various aspects of the composition of the 
workforce of firms 
(a) 
Left-hand side variable 
Coefficient of industry-specific 
tenure effect 
Share of workers aged 55-64   1.0  ***  (0.10) 
Share of workers aged 15-24  -7,1  ***  (0.17) 
Share of flexible workers  -7.8  ***  (0.16) 
Average age workforce *100  1.8  ***  (0.06) 
Average tenure workforce *100  1.1  ***  (0.05) 
(a) Estimation results for five separate regressions explaining different aspects of the workforce composition of 
firms. Variable of interest is a measure of the industry-specific tenure effect. The regressions include control 
variables for firm characteristics like firm size and firm growth. *** indicates that the estimated coefficient is 
significant  at  1%  level.  Standard  errors  in  parentheses.  Complete  estimation  results  are  presented  in  the 
Appendix, table A.3-A.4. 
   
7. Conclusion 
With an ageing labour force, there is an increasing need to understand the relation between 
wage-tenure  profiles  and  the  labour-market  position  of  older  workers.  This  applies  in 
particular  to  the  Dutch  labour  market,  which  is  relatively  rigid.  This  paper  investigates 
whether the wage-tenure profiles in the Netherlands are steep and whether such profiles are 
related to the seniority position of a worker and to the composition of the workforce using a 
large linked employer-employee dataset. 
  The  estimates  presented  in  this  paper  suggest  that  the  returns  to  tenure  in  the 
Netherlands are high relative to other countries. The estimates suggest that for older workers 
it is not very attractive to be mobile. Furthermore, the seniority position of a worker turns out 
to increase wages. This may be related to labour-market institutions protecting senior workers 
relative to younger workers. However, the estimates suggest that the impact of seniority on 
wages is not particularly large. Finally, the results suggest that firms in industries with high 
returns to tenure employ relatively high shares of older workers. These industries also employ 
workers with high average tenures, indicating that steep wage-tenure profiles are correlated 
with low mobility. 
  In  the  Netherlands,  investments  in  firm-specific  human  capital  may  be  high  or 
deferred  compensation  schemes  may  prevail  in  many  industries  and  firms.  Another 




profiles.  Although  from  a  theoretical  point  of  view  high  returns  to  tenure  and  low  job 
mobility may be optimal in terms of welfare, the ageing of the workforce underlines the 
policy relevance of the subject. With the ageing of the workforce, the mechanisms favouring 
wage-tenure profiles become under increasing pressure. As the period of employment at old 
age lengthens, the knowledge of workers risks becoming obsolete, and the employment share 
of  young  workers  decreases.  In  addition,  a  rigid  labour  market  can  harm  labour  market 
efficiency by preventing an optimal allocation of workers across jobs.  
  A limitation of this research is that the data do not allow pinning down all possible 
determinants of steep wage-tenure profiles. For example, investments in firm-specific human 
capital  are  difficult  to  identify  and  the  importance  of  deferred  payment  schemes  is  not 
explicitly  addressed.  So  a  remaining  question  is:  Which  are  the  underlying  mechanisms 
inducing Dutch wage-tenure profiles to be steep? Perhaps the high share of large firms in the 
Netherlands,  offering  large  internal  labour  markets  with  high  specific  investments  and 
deferred payment schemes contributes to the explanation. It is a challenge for future research 
to pin down such underlying mechanisms in more detail.  
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Table A.1   Regression results for Instrumental Variables  
   IV for tenure                   IV for tenure and experience 
   Coef.     Std. Err.     Coef.     Std. Err. 
Dep. variable:  ln ( real hourly wage) 
          tenure  0.0085   ***  0.0011 
 
0.0087  ***  0.0022 
tenure^2  -0.0109  ***  0.0030 
 
-0.0158  ***  0.0031 




0.0040  *  0.0024 







experience  0.1012   ***  0.0013 
 
0.0870  ***  0.0037 
experience^2  -0.4898  ***  0.0121 
 
-0.3768  ***  0.0463 
experience^3  0.1105  ***  0.0041 
 
0.0767  ***  0.0168 
experience^4  -0.0096  ***  0.0005 
 
-0.0060  ***  0.0021 





year dummy 2001  0.0221  ***  0.0017 
 
0.0215  ***  0.0022 
year dummy 2002  0.0185  ***  0.0017 
 
0.0171  ***  0.0034 
year dummy 2003  0.0232  ***  0.0018 
 
0.0213  ***  0.0045 
year dummy 2004  0.0245  ***  0.0018 
 
0.0222  ***  0.0054 
year dummy 2005  0.0185  ***  0.0018 
 
0.0157  ***  0.0063 
dummy education: 
                  lower secondary  0.1143  ***  0.0030 
 
0.1212  ***  0.0104 
    higher secondary  0.3134  ***  0.0029 
 
0.3282  ***  0.0233 
    tertiary  0.7184  ***  0.0029 
 
0.7354  ***  0.0280 
sector of industry: 
                  mining Industry  0.3020  ***  0.0095 
 
0.3030  ***  0.0096 
    manufacturing  0.0190  ***  0.0068 
 
0.0206  ***  0.0069 
    energy and water supply  0.1735  ***  0.0073 
 
0.1679  ***  0.0144 
    construction   0.0830  ***  0.0068 
 
0.0808  ***  0.0072 
    wholesale and retail trade  0.0221  ***  0.0067 
 
0.0275  ***  0.0089 
    hotels and restaurants  -0.0354  ***  0.0089 
 
-0.0347  ***  0.0097 
    transport and communication  0.0707  ***  0.0068 
 
0.0710  ***  0.0069 
    financial interm. & comm. services  0.1409  ***  0.0066 
 
0.1412  ***  0.0067 
constant  11.973  ***  0.1010 
 
12.229  ***  0.0719 
                number of observations  363274 
     
363274 
    adj. R-squared  0.4592           0.4591       
Note: In the IV_ten regresssion tenure, tenure^2 and seniority index are instrumented, while in the IV_tenexp regresssion tenure, tenure^2 , 
seniority index, experience, experience^2, experience^3 and experience^4 are instrumented. In all cases the variables are instrumented by 
the deviation from its average over the job spell. The regression is carried out on a sample of full time working males, aged 18-60, employed 
in the private sector in enterprises with at least 10 employees. 




Table A.2   Regression results FD-model (excluding / including seniority index) 
   FD           FD       
   Coef.     Std. Err.     Coef.     Std. Err. 
Dep. variable:  ln (real hourly wage growth) 
       
Δ tenure^2 
-
0.0082  ***  0.0019 
 
-0.0076  ***  0.0021 
Δ experience^2 / 100 
-
0.2696  ***  0.0094 
 
-0.3994  ***  0.0088 
Δ experience^3 / 1000  0.0512  ***  0.0030 
 
0.0885  ***  0.0029 
Δ experience^4 / 10000 
-
0.0041  ***  0.0003 
 
-0.0077  ***  0.0003 
Δ ln (number of workers firm)  0.0014  ***  0.0001 
 
0.0037  ***  0.0009 
Δ seniority index 
       
0.0020  **  0.0008 
constant  0.0837  ***  0.0025 
 
0.1031  ***  0.0025 
                number of observations  258692 
     
253016 
    adj. R-squared   0.0613           0.0709       
Note:  This regression refers to step one of the FD-model (See Topel, 1991). Note that Δexperience and Δ tenure (which are equal to 1 
each year by definition) are not included; their effect are included in the estimated constant.  The regression is carried out on a sample of 
full time working males, aged 23-60, employed in the private sector in enterprises with at least 10 employees. As control variables are 
included: 5 year dummies (2001-2005), 3 dummy variables for level of attained education, 8 dummy variables for sector of industry and 40 
dummy variables for occupation. The regression including the seniority index refers to age group 18-60 (consistent with table 2); for the 





Table A.3   Regression results age structure firms 
   Share Age 55-64     Share Age 15-24     Share Flexible Contracts 
   Coef.     Std. Err.     Coef.     Std. Err.      Coef. 
 
Std. Err.  
sector specific tenure coef.  10.228  ***  0.1003 
 
-71.327  ***  0.1695 
 
-7.8176  ***  0.1537 
share educ lower sec.  -0.0172  ***  0.0032 
 
0.0161  ***  0.0053 
 
-0.0215  ***  0.0048 
share educ higher sec.  -0.0208  ***  0.0030 
 
-0.0090  *  0.0051 
 
-0.0370  ***  0.0046 
share educ tertiary  -0.0289  ***  0.0032 
 
-0.0877  ***  0.0054 
 
-0.0596  ***  0.0049 
ln (number of workers firm)  -0.0026  ***  0.0003 
 
0.0034  ***  0.0005 
 
0.0116  ***  0.0005 
growth firm size  -0.0077  ***  0.0009 
 





contant  0.1026  ***  0.0034 
 
0.2161  ***  0.0059 
 
0.0700  ***  0.0053 
                        number of observations  36650 
     
36650 
     
36650 
    adj. R-squared  0.0373 
     
0.1011 
     
0.1154 
    Note: These three regressions are carried out at the firm level. Year dummies 2001-2005 are included as control variables. The dependent 
variables are the share of a certain group of workers (aged 55-64; aged 15-24; working on a flexible contract) in the firm. The variable of 
interest is the sector specific tenure coefficient. This coefficient is obtained from an IV_tenexp-regression comparable to the one in table 







Table A.4   Regression results for average age and tenure of firms  
   average age firm*100     average tenure firm*100 
   Coef.     Std. Err.     Coef.     Std. Err. 
sector specific tenure coef.  1.7533  ***  0.0627 
 
1.0685  ***  0.0504 














-0.0093  ***  0.0016 
ln (number of workers firm)  -0.0019  ***  0.0002 
 
0.0025  ***  0.0002 
growth firm size  -0.0067  ***  0.0006 
 
-0.0101  ***  0.0005 
constante  0.3734  ***  0.0002 
 
0.0516  ***  0.0017 
               
number of obs.  36650 
     
36650 
   
adj. R-squared  0.0493           0.0355       
Note: These two regressions are carried out at the firm level. Year dummies 2001-2005 are included as control variables. The dependent 
variables are the average age in the firm*100 and the average tenure in the firm*100. The variable of interest is the sector specific tenure 
coefficient. This coefficient is obtained from an IV_tenexp-regression comparable to the one in table A.1, but extended with the following 
interaction term:  sector of industry * tenure.  Publisher:
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